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Interdisciplinarity within Phenomenology 
 





Recognition of phenomenological tendencies in several dozen disciplines beyond philosophy 
raises the question of how phenomenology in general might be defined prior to specification in 
terms of the agendas of the particular disciplines. After an attempt at an answer to this question, 
some observations concerning the possible benefits of interdisciplinary encounters, especially for 





To judge by the suffixes of the e-mail addresses of the 
subscribers to the Newsletter of Phenomenology, there 
are at least 3,750 self-identified phenomenologists 
alive today in over 50 countries.1 Recent efforts to 
understand the combinations of these phenomenolo-
gists across the planet have thus far identified over 
180 local phenomenological organizations, including 
one in Siberia, and considerable progress has been 
made to include these organizations in the world-wide 
Organization of Phenomenological Organizations, as 
well as to establish five regional organizations for 
them. Of these, the Circulo LatinoAmericano de 
Fenomenologia was the first, and the fifth, the 
Interdisciplinary Coalition of North American 
Phenomenologists, has just been founded. 
 
There is reason to believe, however, that what has 
                                                 
1 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States 
of America, and Venezuela. 
thus come together in a loose and bottom-up way is 
still chiefly composed of phenomenological 
philosophers, while the approximately three dozen 
disciplines beyond philosophy which include self-
identified phenomenologists are underrepresented.2 It 
would seem probable, then, that non-philosophical 
phenomenologists will in coming years considerably 
increase the counts just offered of colleagues and 
organizations in our tradition. Efforts prominent in 
East Asia are already fostering this trend. 
 
There is also reason to believe that relations between 
phenomenology and philosophy could benefit from 
more contact with phenomenology in disciplines 
beyond philosophy, and hence to ask how this might 
happen. And when one tries to get beyond specifically 
philosophical phenomenology, the question also 
arises of what phenomenology in general might be.  
 
                                                 
2 Archaeology, Architecture, Cognitive Science, 
Communicology, Counselling, Cultural Anthropology, 
Ecology, Economics, Education, English, Ethnic Studies, 
Ethnology, Ethnomethodology, Film Studies, French, 
Geography (Behavioural), Geography (Social), 
Hermeneutics, History, Linguistics, Law, Literature, 
Medical Anthropology, Medicine, Musicology, Nursing, 
Philosophy of Religion, Political Science, Psychiatry, 
Psychology, Psychopathology, Religious Education, 
Social Work, Sociology, and Theology. 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology  Volume 10, Edition 1  May 2010  Page 2 of 7 
  ISSN (online) : 1445-7377   DOI: 10.2989/IPJP.2010.10.1.2.1074      ISSN (print) : 2079-7222 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg (South Africa) and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies (Australia), published in association with NISC (Pty) Ltd.  It can be found at www.ipjp.org 
 
This work is licensed to the publisher under the Creative Commons Attributions License 3.0 
 
An attempt is made in what follows to answer this 
second question before the first. 
 
What is Phenomenology? 
 
This question has been struggled with ever since 
Edmund Husserl named his effort more than a century 
ago. Most attempts to answer it have come from 
philosophers and focus on philosophical phenomeno-
logy, but it is now also a regular question in 
disciplines beyond philosophy, and the answer may 
be different if one seeks to cover all the disciplines 
within our multidisciplinary tradition. There is need 
for a generic answer that can be specified according 
to the discipline. Having pondered this issue for some 
time, let me offer a “stratified answer” by which I go 
to deeper levels according to how strong the interest 
of my interlocutor is.  
 
When I am asked these days what phenomenology is, 
I first explain that Husserl thought he was founding or 
re-founding first philosophy as a strict science and 
hence gave it a name ending in “-ology” as would be 
appropriate for a science, but that if one were an 
intellectual historian one might well speak of 
something like “reflective descriptivism” and include 
similar positions, such as those of Bergson, Dilthey 
and the early James. Then I suggest that it is better to 
characterize the Husserlian effort by its approach 
rather than by its results, and hence report that I like 
most simply to call it “reflective analysis” (Embree, 
2003, 2006). If this answer does not satisfy, I go 
down to deeper levels of definition. 
 
To characterize the approach shared in disciplines 
beyond philosophy as well as in phenomenological 
philosophy, I then propose three defining 
characteristics by saying that this approach is, in 
essence, (a) reflective, (b) descriptive, and (c) culture-
appreciative. But I usually still need to go deeper.  
 
I describe the reflectiveness of phenomenology as 
involving the observation in oneself and one’s groups, 
and in others and their groups, of encounterings of 
things, things-as-encountered, and also of the 
collective and individual subjects who encounter 
things. (I quickly clarify that I use “thing” to refer to 
anything at all and not merely material objects.) Then 
I explain that I prefer words based on the verb “to 
encounter”, because mention of “encountering” nicely 
raises the question of what is encountered, and 
because it is easier (at least in English) to recognize 
that encounterings concretely include, in addition to 
experiencings, the components best called believings, 
valuings, and willings. These thetic or positional 
components can be positive, negative or neutral in 
modality, and moreover, correlatively, the things-as-
encountered – which can be ideal as well as real and, 
if real, then spatio-temporal as well as purely 
temporal – include appearances, manners of 
givenness, and intrinsic and extrinsic positive, 
negative and neutral belief characteristics, values and 
uses. Reflective observation, which is a skill that 
needs to be cultivated, discloses a great deal that this 
taxonomy only begins to sort out.3 
 
As for how phenomenology is descriptive, I say that 
description involves the mental transition from the 
grasping of things reflectively or unreflectively to 
words naming and characterizing them, and add that, 
when the thing from which one thus proceeds is a 
speech or a text, it is appropriate to speak of 
interpretation, but then interpretation is a species of 
description in my broad signification. Furthermore, 
descriptions can be of universal essences, concepts, 
and both fictively and seriously experienced real 
things. Moreover, description is prior to explanation, 
knowing what something is being necessary for 
knowing why something is. Finally, descriptions 
invite the reader or hearer to look for herself to see 
whether the things described are as described and, if 
not, to correct or improve the descriptions and thus to 
advance the investigation. 
 
What I have said thus far is hardly new for 
phenomenologists, but some may be intrigued by my 
assertion that phenomenology is culture-appreciative. 
I came to recognize the importance of this property by 
asking what it is that phenomenology in all of the 
disciplines that I know anything about is opposed to. 
That contrasting position is called “naturalism”, 
“objectivism” or “positivism.” Husserl preferred 
“objectivism”, but this expression has not become 
widely accepted. While positivism is a movement in 
theory of social science and philosophy that goes 
back over 150 years and holds that all knowledge 
should be, or be modelled on, naturalistic science, 
“naturalism” seems to convey the broadest concept, 
one that extends beyond science into a spreading 
worldview that some consider a major source of 
today’s ecological crisis. For naturalism, everything is 
physical nature, and what is not physical does not 
count; and this excludes, above all, culture and mental 
life. 
                                                 
3  An incomplete chart may be useful here: 
 
 Encountering        Things-as-Encountered 
 positive, negative, and        Intrinsic & extrinsic uses 
         neutral willing      
 ditto   valuing         ditto values 
 ditto   believing                        ditto belief characteristics 
 experiencing (perceptual,         appearances & manners  
 recollectional, expectational)              of givenness 
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Let me insert that a suggestion of Geoffrey Lloyd 
(1991) deserves consideration. This is the suggestion 
that the West is different from other cultures because, 
in effect, it learned early on to abstract from culture 
and mind in order to focus on physical nature. With 
nature defined, one can develop not only naturalistic 
science but also naturalistic-scientific technology and 
ever more power over practically everything. But, of 
course, if the abstraction from spirit is the source of 
naturalism, and if one goes on to consider the result – 
that is, nature – to be concrete, which defines 
naturalism, then the fallacy of misplaced concreteness 
is committed, because the lifeworld is originally and 
concretely not only natural but also socio-cultural.  
 
Phenomenologists are currently quite interested in 
how we encounter others and are encountered by 
them, so sociality is now receiving its due attention. 
As for how the world is originally cultural, however, I 
do not believe this has received the attention in our 
tradition that it deserves. I believe that the world is 
cultural in two ways. On the higher level there are, as 
Alfred Schütz has shown, conceptual constructs of 
things in common sense that we chiefly receive from 
contemporaries and predecessors through ordinary 
language. But, under the stratum of language, there is 
a subconceptual stratum that I call “basic culture” 
(Embree, 2008a). On this deeper level, reflection can 
disclose encounterings, and the values and uses of 
things-as-encountered, whether or not these are 
grasped in commonsense constructs, and these 
matters of basic culture are also chiefly learned from 
and shared with individual and collective others. It 
may be that the original cultural character of all things 
is often mistakenly overlooked because there is so 
much variety to it.  
 
That the world is socio-cultural seems more 
appreciated in the human, socio-historical, or, best, 
the cultural sciences than in phenomenological 
philosophy thus far. I prefer to call them cultural 
sciences also because, as Gurwitsch and Merleau-
Ponty already knew in the 1930s, chimpanzees have 
basic culture (Embree, 2008b). This is culture as often 
focused on in ethnology or cultural anthropology, but 
it is distinctively present in the subject matters of all 
of the cultural disciplines if one looks carefully 
(Embree, 1994). 
 
Edmund Husserl, of course, recognized the 
Geisteswissenschaften, but he and his early followers 
saw the need to analyze the foundations of socio-
cultural things first, thus abstractively focused on the 
constitution of experienced nature, and did not finally 
come fully to give culture and society the attention 
they deserve. The naturalism in the mentalities of 
their readers has not helped in this connection. 
Nevertheless, there have been places for valuing and 
willing and thus axiology and praxiology in Husserl’s 
project at least since he analyzed how warriors ought 
to be courageous in his Prolegomena zur reinen Logik 
of 1900, and, if looked for, these aspects are also 
quite evident in his Ideën I and II of 1913 and 
elsewhere (Embree, 1992, 1996).  
 
I hope I have said enough to clarify how I believe 
phenomenology in general is not only reflective and 
descriptive, but also culture-appreciative. Let me now 
turn to the topic of interdisciplinarity. 
 
Phenomenology Can Be More Interdisciplinary 
 
There seems a disciplinary imbalance within our 
tradition. Colleagues in other disciplines continue to 
learn much from philosophical phenomenology, and 
philosophers must be proud of that, but they do not 
benefit in return nearly as much as they might. 
Research is interdisciplinary when convergent 
research in one or more other disciplines is taken 
quite seriously. 
 
The question of traditions becoming more inter-
disciplinary has tended to be approached beginning 
from the disciplines and then considering tendencies, 
orientations or schools of thought, such as 
phenomenology, as at best secondary. After all, where 
our professional identities are concerned, most of us 
are philosophers, economists, political scientists, 
psychologists, sociologists and so forth first and 
Marxists, positivists, phenomenologists and so forth 
only second. The structures of academic institutions 
and degree programmes support this approach. And 
we have had disciplinary differences since Aristotle 
and the seven liberal arts of the Middle Ages.4 But 
here I shall ignore other traditions such as Marxism 
and positivism and focus specifically on how, within 
our own huge phenomenological tradition, there are 
disciplinary differences that can be dealt with for 
maximum benefit to all involved.  
 
Thus far, and as intimated, while disciplines beyond 
                                                 
4 The phenomenologist Joseph Kockelmans (1979) offered 
this definition of “discipline” late in the 20th Century: “A 
branch of learning or a field of study characterized as a 
body of intersubjectively accepted knowledge pertaining 
to a well-defined realm of entities, systematically 
established on the basis of generally accepted principles 
with the help of methodological rules or procedures, e.g., 
mathematics, chemistry, history.” It deserves mention 
that Kockelmans draws, among much else, on the work 
on interdisciplinarity of the phenomenologist Georges 
Gusdorf, author of “Interdisciplinaire (Connaissance)” in 
the Encyclopaedia Universalis (1966-73) and of Les 
Sciences Humaines et la Pensée Occidentale (1966-88). 
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philosophy have adapted concepts, distinctions, 
methods, terminology and so on from philosophical 
phenomenologists, relatively little has been learned 
by philosophical phenomenologists from disciplines 
beyond philosophy. To be sure, much was learned in 
the past by Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty from 
Gestalttheorie, by Schütz from Verstehende sociology 
and marginal utility economics, and by hermeneutical 
phenomenologists from classical philology, and 
others have gained much from studying psycho-
analysis and other schools of psychiatry; but these 
past cases seem exceptions more than the rule, and 
today there seems little other than the 
phenomenological interest in the multidiscipline of 
cognitive science. But what if encounters with non-
philosophical phenomenology could help self-
identified philosophical phenomenologists become 
better phenomenologists? 
 
Please permit me to proceed now somewhat 
autobiographically. I was an undergraduate major in 
philosophy with a minor in psychology, but that was 
behaviouristic psychology and rather off-putting. In 
my doctoral studies at the New School for Social 
Research, which was still under Weimar influence 
and thus unlike American programmes of typically 
monodisciplinary British influence, I was required to 
have a minor. So I took courses on Wilhelm Dilthey 
and on German sociology with the Weber scholar 
Albert Solomon. Then, for almost 30 years after 
graduating, I was immersed in American academic 
philosophy, which was then, and still is, quite 
naturalistic – and, I would add, anti-interdisciplinary, 
very few philosophical colleagues even recognizing 
the human or cultural sciences as sciences. 
  
At Duquesne University, however, I did have friends 
in the psychology department where phenomeno-
logical psychology was developed as a human 
science. (In retrospect, I must also recognize that I 
was always fascinated by the phenomenological 
theory of value and theoretical ethics of Dorion 
Cairns, as well as by how Aron Gurwitsch related the 
analysis of Zeug in the early Heidegger to Wolfgang 
Koehler’s account of functional objects as 
encountered by chimpanzees.) 
 
When I came to Florida Atlantic University in 1990 
and had a great increase in resources, I reacted against 
the intellectualism of most Husserlians in my 
generation by, as noted above, studying the noetico-
noematic analyses of valuation and action in Books I 
and II of Husserl’s Ideën. By then I was also deeply 
involved in studying the thought of Schütz, whose 
Wissenschaftslehre focuses on the genus, species, and 
some particulars in the cultural sciences, and also in 
reflecting on the history and philosophy of 
archaeology, ecology, gender and technology. In 
retrospect, I can now recognize that I was then 
seriously turning toward culture. 
 
Next, Alexander Schimmelpenninck proposed in 
1992 that I and my colleagues in the Centre for 
Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. edit the 
Encyclopaedia of Phenomenology (Embree et al., 
1997). It was in that connection that I began more 
clearly to recognize not only how, in the course of a 
century, our tradition had spread across the planet, but 
also how it was pursued in over a score of non-
philosophical disciplines, namely architecture, 
behavioural geography, cognitive science, communi-
cology, dance, ecology, economics, education, ethnic 
studies, ethnology, film, hermeneutics, literature, 
music, nursing, political science, psychiatry, 
psychology, religion, social geography, sociology, 
and theatre. I kept finding more and more disciplines 
beyond philosophy with phenomenological 
tendencies, if not schools of thought, within them! 
Since then I have, of course, identified more and more 
such disciplines. 
 
In the introduction to our encyclopaedia, Jiten 
Mohanty and I sketched the evolution of the 
phenomenological agenda – that is, how issues were 
added to it decade by decade, such as gender by Edith 
Stein in the 1920s (Stein, 1996) and generational 
difference by Simone de Beauvoir in 1970 (Beauvoir, 
1989). Re-reading that introduction in preparation for 
the present essay, however, I self-critically find it 
rather philosophy-centric and hence must say that at 
that time I still had not fully appreciated how 
multidisciplinary our tradition has long been. But I 
am still proud enough in this respect of the opening 
paragraph of our introduction to quote it now: 
 
Although anticipations can be found in the 
works of Henri Bergson, Franz Brentano, 
Wilhelm Dilthey, William James, and others, 
the phenomenological movement began in 
the reflections of Edmund Husserl during the 
mid-1890s and is thus more than a century 
old. It spread from Germany to Japan, 
Russia, and Spain and also from philosophy 
to psychiatry before World War I; to 
Australia, France, Hungary, the Netherlands 
and Flanders, Poland, and the United States 
and to education, music, and religion during 
the 1920s; and to Czechoslovakia, Italy, 
Korea, and Yugoslavia and to architecture, 
literature, and theatre during the 1930s. 
Phenomenology then spread to Portugal, 
Scandinavia, and South Africa, and also to 
ethnic studies, feminism, film, and political 
theory soon after World War II; then to 
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Canada, China, and India and to dance, 
geography, law, and psychology in the 1960s 
and 1970s; and finally to Great Britain and 
also to ecology, ethnology, and nursing in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Given its spread to 
other disciplines as well as across the planet, 
phenomenology is arguably the major 
philosophical movement of the 20th Century. 
      (Embree, 1997, p. 1)  
 
In retrospect, however, I can now recognize that I 
then still had what might be called a merely 
intellectual appreciation of the non-philosophical 
disciplines within phenomenology. This seems to 
have still been the case for my paper at the second 
meeting, in Lima in 2005, of the Organization of 
Phenomenological Organizations (Embree, 2007). 
Three more events took me beyond that. The first was 
a conference in Taipei in September 2006, and the 
second was a conference in Seoul in February 2007. 
What happened at those conferences was that I 
encountered phenomenology as actually being done 
by colleagues in disciplines beyond philosophy. It is 
amazing that this had not happened for me before 
then, or at least that I had not recognized it. And the 
third thing was when Tom Nenon and I came to write 
the introduction to the volume on North America for 
Phenomenology 2005 and I began to suspect that the 
distinctive feature of phenomenology in our 
geographical region is its multidisciplinarity. 
 
These three events had what some might consider a 
curious impact on me. I have long been among those 
who have complained that the vast majority of those 
who call themselves phenomenologists are only 
scholars who contribute to the secondary literature. 
Much of my own contribution is of this sort, of 
course, and I do believe we need secondary literature 
because so much of the writing of the giants of our 
past is difficult to understand and we must help each 
other understand them. But such secondary literature 
is a means to the end of phenomenological 
investigations of the things themselves – that is, not 
philology but phenomenology, and thus the 
production of primary literature. This is what I hope 
philosophers in our tradition who have not previously 
got beyond interpretation of texts can learn to do by 
encountering phenomenology as actually done in 
disciplines beyond philosophy. And this is why I have 
sought to found the Interdisciplinary Coalition of 
North American Phenomenologists (ICNAP). I hope 
it will be a place where soi disant philosophical 
phenomenologists will be reminded of the need to be 
or become phenomenologists. 
 
Let me mention one other factor. When called on not 
to think or write about earlier phenomenology, but 
actually to do phenomenology, I suspect that many 
colleagues in effect ask themselves if they could be 
the next Merleau-Ponty and quickly answer in the 
negative. In that case, however, it is still possible to 
attempt modest and concise reflective analyses, and I 
have increasingly tried to do that myself in recent 
years, and also started a book series with Zeta Books, 
Phenomenological Workshop Texts, for collections of 
such analyses. 
  
A Final Caution 
 
Having now not only thought about phenomenology 
as a tradition that has become ever increasingly 
multidisciplinary during little over a century, but 
having encountered some phenomenology as actually 
done in disciplines beyond philosophy, let me offer 
some final remarks to fellow phenomenologists in 
philosophy. To begin with, I urge not just reading 
work by colleagues in disciplines beyond philosophy, 
but also hearing their presentations and discussing 
their work with them. It can be very encouraging 
when colleagues in different disciplines meet and find 
they have convergent practical as well as theoretical 
interests. (Discovering that an associate dean in our 
nursing school is a phenomenologist has already 
improved enrolments in one of my courses!) 
 
Interdisciplinary encountering is like foreign travel – 
often initially difficult and uncomfortable, with many 
strange things and unexpected developments, even a 
type of culture shock is possible, but ultimately it is 
rewarding. Philosophers can become irritated by 
misused terminology and deeply misunderstood 
methods used by non-philosophical colleagues. Often, 
I must confess, I find a “disciplinary superiority 
complex”, as it might be called, actually in myself as 
well as in others. Is it not easy, however, to imagine 
that an economist similarly believes that her 
discipline addresses the most important aspect of 
social life, or that a psychologist or sociologist 
believes that hers does?  
 
If one’s superiority complex is overt, it can be called 
“disciplinary arrogance”, something I have seen in 
phenomenological philosophers who look down on 
social scientists, nurses, and so forth. Such 
philosophical colleagues would do well, however, to 
consider how ridiculous our philosophical 
preoccupations with such things as ultimate 
grounding, being qua being, whether the world exists, 
why there is something rather than nothing, 
transcendental intersubjectivity, and so forth, may 
possibly appear to colleagues in disciplines beyond 
philosophy, especially the practical ones! Being 
“discipline-centric” seems inevitable and is probably 
not a bad thing where the development of specialized 
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knowledge and skill are concerned. But, just as with 
class, ethnicity, gender and nationality, where there 
are also tendencies toward superiority complexes and 
arrogance, it is wise to practise tolerance, 
“disciplinary tolerance” as it might be called, for then 
the benefits of interdisciplinarity on all sides are the 
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